



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Central Intelligence Bulletin

Top Secret

207

14 October 1972

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14 October 1972

Central Intelligence Bulletin

CONTENTS

25X1

YEMEN (SANA) - YEMEN (ADEN): Full-scale hostilities appear imminent. (Page 2)


MOROCCO: Hassan may cut US military presence to gain political support. (Page 4)

LEBANON-FEDAYEEN: Extremists may still disrupt delicate truce. (Page 5)

25X1

25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt



553712 10-72

(YEMEN (SANA) - YEMEN (ADEN): Full-scale hostilities between the two Yemens appear imminent, despite efforts by an Arab League mediation committee to resolve the differences between Sana and Aden.

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[redacted] The Sana government, probably responding to pressure from military and tribal leaders, has apparently decided to give full support to the effort to overthrow the leftist Aden regime.

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Aden's Perim Island--at the entrance to the Red Sea--was shelled from Yemen (Sana) territory on 11 October, [redacted] A force of National Unity Front dissidents was also [redacted] assembling opposite the island preparatory to a landing but an attempt was being made to negotiate a surrender by the island's garrison. Although Aden has not confirmed an attack on Perim, it claimed on 12 October that Sana was massing troops near Perim and plotting its occupation. Some substance was given to Aden's contention when Sana's president and prime minister, in separate interviews with European journalists, described Perim as properly belonging to Yemen (Sana). Perim, with a population of about 1,000, lies about two miles from the mainland. It was occupied by the British in the mid-19th century and administered from Aden by the British until Yemen (Aden) became independent in 1967.

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14 Oct 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

2

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Meanwhile, the Arab League mediation contingent--minus the Libyan representative who was withdrawn on President Qadhafi's orders--returned to Yemen (Aden) on 12 October. The mediators have demanded a cease-fire and a troop withdrawal from the border. They also invited delegations from the two Yemens to meet in Cairo on 21 October for discussions leading to a summit conference between the two sides. From every present indication, Sana intends to disregard the mediators' proposals.

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14 Oct 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

3

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MOROCCO: King Hassan may reduce the US military presence in Morocco in order to win support from his opposition.

Some political leaders, including the monarchists, have indicated their willingness to participate in forthcoming elections, but they are demanding a diminution of the King's power as a prerequisite for their cooperation. Although a number of Morocco's leading politicians are ready to begin talks with the King, most remain skeptical of his intentions to alter his form of rule significantly. Moreover, the parties are deeply divided and probably will be unable to agree on their conditions for participating in a new government.

In his effort to gain backing from opposition leaders, Hassan may consider responding to their call for an end to foreign military bases in Morocco.

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The King presumably would not want to antagonize the US at a time when his domestic position is weak. However, he may consider ordering some reduction in the US presence at Kenitra or the termination of the US training program, not only because of his genuine misgivings about the US but to gain domestic political advantage.

25X1

14 Oct 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin

4


25X1

LEBANON-FEDAYEEN: The accommodation reached late last month between the government and the commandos is holding up, but extremists may still attempt to disrupt the delicate truce.

The army continues to enforce its restrictions on the fedayeen and thus far there have been no serious incidents between Lebanese forces and the guerrillas. Most of the larger fedayeen organizations appear willing to continue to observe the agreement which temporarily restricts their operations into Israel.





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Despite its limited strength, the PFLP-GC is apparently well armed and financed. 

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

The militant Libyan regime may well have encouraged the PFLP-GC to resume operations into Israel in spite of the Lebanese Government's ban on such actions. 

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14 Oct 72

Central Intelligence Bulletin


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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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